6月30日发布的 FY2020 移民局监察报告，用了专门一章来讨论 OPT，参见 P62-P85，“Foreign Students and the Risks Surrounding Optional Practical Training”。
在2007到2018年间，OPT 发放量从2.5万增长到20万。报告提到了 OPT 不公的税收优惠：F-1 学生身份意味着无需缴纳社保税和医保税（Social Security & Medicare Tax）。此外，报告花了很大篇幅讨论 OPT 项目的风险，并得出结论：OPT 使得学生能在高校、研究机构和商业公司工作，可能接触到科学技术、知识产权等敏感信息。PRC 等外国政府通过学生、以及在学生中混入情报人员，来获取知识产权和前沿技术，从而达到经济、科技和军事的进步，而 OPT 项目的设计与管理并不能防止此类威胁。
The risk analysis framework applied in this study indicates that risk is present in the environment surrounding the OPT and STEM OPT programs. These programs allow many nonimmigrant students, including graduate students in STEM, to work in academic, research or corporate environments where they may have access to technologies or other intellectual property that may be sensitive or proprietary in nature. Foreign entities like the PRC government with clearly expressed intentions to achieve economic, technical and military dominance by acquiring intellectual property and cutting-edge innovations, have succeeded in leveraging some portion of its student population to perform as NTCs, while also inserting intelligence operatives into the mix of students working in the United States, often for significant periods of time. OPT, which has not been designed, staffed or administered to systemically counter such threats, is vulnerable to exploitation by foreign governments with interests adverse to those of the United States. Accordingly, there appears to be a high risk that the OPT is being used as a means for strategic adversaries to conduct espionage and technology transfer from the United States.
报告里的另一份数字：FY2019 移民局归化了83万人，而截至 2019/12/31 积压申请65万份。也就是说，每份申请平均至少要等9个月，才能开始处理。公民归化的「排期」也越来越长了 [报道]。